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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of mechanical restraints on students with disabilities in public
schools is an emerging education law issue of national significance.'
Following a 2009 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
that documented numerous accounts of abuse and death, the Secretary of
Education called on states to review their current policies on the use of
restraints and seclusion.2 However, congressional efforts to address
restraints have not been successful; for example, the Keeping Students Safe
Act proposed in the House of Representatives failed to gain sufficient
support to pass. In 2011, Senator Tom Harkin introduced a new version of
the bill in the Senate; however, he is unsure if the modified version will
1. See, e.g., Kaukab Smith, Senate Committee Considers Positive Alternatives to
Seclusion and Restraint of School Children, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION

EXCHANGE (Jul. 13, 2012), http://jjie.org/senate-committee-considers-positivealtematives-seclusion-restraint-of-school-children/ (discussing the dissatisfaction

among parents about the use of restraints).
2. See, e.g., NANCY LEE JONES & JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL75700, THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE LEGAL ISSUES

2, 10 (2010) (relaying the Secretary of Education's Response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO 09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND RESTRAINTS: SELECTED CASES OF DEATH AND ABUSE

AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND TREATMENT CENTERS 7 (2009) (describing the

injuries sustained by students due to the use of restraints and seclusion).
3. See Perry Zirkel, Restraining the Use of Restraints For Students With
Disabilities:An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Case Law, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 323, 32829 (2011) (acknowledging how H.R. 4247, which called for sanctions for excessive
restraint use, failed to pass in the Senate).
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generate adequate approval from Congress.4
Although federal law does not specifically address restraints in the
classroom context, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
entitles all students with disabilities to a "free appropriate public
education" (FAPE). 5 Nevertheless, federal courts have maintained a
passive role in enforcing this requirement, as they are reluctant to interfere
with local education policy. 6
The Tenth Circuit demonstrated this reluctance in its decision in Ebonie
S. v. Pueblo School DistrictNo. 60, holding that the school's use of a wraparound desk with a mechanical restraint did not violate the student's Fourth
or Fourteenth Amendment rights.7 Additionally, the court refused to
address the validity of the practice under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) or IDEA.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit improperly dismissed the
student's claims because the use of a desk with a mechanical restraint
violated the student's rights. 9 Part II of this Comment provides a brief
overview of IDEA.'0 Part II also examines the special education
jurisprudence on the use of restraints in public schools and explains the
facts and procedural history of Ebonie S. v. Pueblo School District No.
60.11 Part III argues that the school's use of a wrap-around desk was an
unreasonable seizure that deprived the student of due process and of a free

4. See Smith, supra note 1 (conceding that the legislation may fail to pass through
a deadlocked Congress).
5. See Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1978)
(introducing a "free appropriate public education" which is provided at public expense,
meets state content standards, and conforms with the Individualized Education
Program).
6. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)
(insisting that federal courts lack the expertise to make sound judgments on local
educational policy).
7. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1059 (10th Cir.
2012) (holding that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims fail as a matter of
law).
8. See id. at 1054 (declining to address the validity of the desk under either of the
federal special education statutes).
9. See infra Part III (critiquing the holding and rationale of the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Ebonie S.).

10. See infra Part II.A (discussing the "discrimination" provision in § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the "free and appropriate public education" provision of the
IDEA).
11. See infra Part II.C & D (describing the jurisprudential development of special
education litigation).
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and appropriate public education.12
Part IV recommends that legislators address the issue by requiring
schools to work closely with parents of students with disabilities to ensure
that these students are not deprived of their constitutional rights.13 Finally,
Part V concludes that by dismissing the constitutional claims and refusing
to apply the federal special education statutes, the Tenth Circuit is allowing
schools to deprive students of their right to learn.14
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Individuals With DisabilitiesEducationAct
Less than twenty years after Brown v. Board of Education, federal courts
began to assume a greater role in addressing the rights of students with
disabilities.' 5
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
struck down a law that permitted the school to exclude students who were
mentally disabled.16 Similarly, in Mills v. Board of Education of D.C., the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the local
school system was obligated to provide publicly funded support for
exceptional children.' 7
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was Congress' first response to
these cases; passed in 1973, this statute recognized the right of disabled
students to a public education and penalized states for discriminating
against exceptional students.' 8 Perhaps more monumental for education
12. See infra Part III (arguing that the use of the wrap-around desk violates the
Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the "free appropriate public

education" requirement of IDEA).
13. See infra Part IV (recommending a policy that corresponds with the objectives
of H.R. 4247 and S. 2020 to ensure greater protection for students with disabilities).
14. See infra Part V (concluding that the Tenth Circuit erred in granting summary
judgment).
15. See generally ALLAN G. OSBORNE & CHARLES Russo, SPECIAL EDUCATION
AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 7 (2006) (suggesting that Brown v. Bd. of

Educ., 347 U.S. 383 (1954), paved the way for exclusion to be examined for other
marginalized groups).
16. See Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (mandating that the school cannot deny a student with mental
disabilities access to school programs).
17. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972)
(holding that the school system must design educational facilities to accommodate
exceptional children).
18. See Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) (making the receipt of federal
funds contingent upon the fair treatment of all students).
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law, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) declared
that each child was entitled to a FAPE.19 Since its passage, EAHCA has
been amended and reauthorized several times and is presently known as
IDEA.20
Like most federal education statutes, IDEA has a financial incentive for
states that comply. 2 ' Unfortunately, this financial incentive does not
guarantee the quality of public education that states provide to students;
thus, states can still abide by IDEA without properly addressing the needs
of students.22
The Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of the FAPE provision
of IDEA in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School
District v. Rowley.23 In Rowley, parents of a deaf child sued the school
district after the district refused to provide the child with a sign language
interpreter.24 The Court ruled that the child was not eligible for an
interpreter because the child was making satisfactory academic progress.25
Noting that the school provided the child with enough specialized
instruction to allow her to advance, the Rowley Court held that the school
satisfied IDEA requirements. 2 6 Accordingly, the progeny of post-Rowley
special education cases have relied upon this interpretation of FAPE, thus
perpetuating a judicial reluctance to interfere in local educational policy.2 7
19. See Education for All Handicapped Children's Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-

142, 89 Stat. 773 (requiring that schools provide students with disabilities access to a
public education, and that school resources are devoted to education).
20. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing the legislative history of
special education statutes).
21. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1),
1415(a) (1978) (emphasizing that states only receive funding if they provide free
appropriate public education that fits the individualized needs of the child).
22. See generally Sarah Marquez, Note, Protecting Students With Disabilities:
Amending the Individual With Disabilities Education Act To Regulate The Use of
Restraints in Public Schools, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 617, 626 (2010) (asserting the low

standard that schools have to meet to comply with IDEA).
23. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cen. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
201 (1982) (declaring that IDEA requires states to provide supportive services that
allow a handicapped child to benefit from special education).
24. See id. at 185 (recounting the Rowleys' unsuccessful attempts to obtain an
interpreter for their deaf daughter).
25. See id. at 203 (noting that advancement to higher grade levels is an important
factor in ascertaining educational benefit).
26. See id. at 200-01 (affirming that a "free appropriate public education" is one
that provides each child a basic floor of educational opportunity).
27. See, e.g., Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243,
1255 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting that courts should not evaluate educational policy
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B. A FreeAppropriate PublicEducation
According to IDEA, a FAPE is an educational program that meets state
content requirements and corresponds with the Individualized Education
Program (IEP) for each child.2 8 An IEP is a written document that contains
specific goals and achievement markers that correspond to a child's
needs. 29 Additionally, an IEP describes a child's academic goals and
describes the special education services needed to achieve these goals.30
While IEPs vary depending on the needs of each child, all IEPs are to be
developed by parents, special education teachers, and school
administrators. 3 ' Additionally, IDEA requires that the IEP teams give
consideration to some specific factors, such as behavioral problems, visual
impairments, and physical disabilities.32 Because IDEA's purpose is to
ensure quality education for students with disabilities, the IEP is a
fundamental component of a FAPE.33
C. Case Law Interpreting the Use ofRestraints
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a child's liberty interest
may be modified in an educational setting. 34 In Ingraham v. Wright, junior
high students who were paddled by teachers sought declaratory and
injunctive relief." The Court ruled for the school, holding that corporal
because such responsibility is that of local officials).
28. See Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1978)
(highlighting the importance of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) in the
public education of exceptional children).
29. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (requiring an appropriate program to contain
measurable academic and functional goals).
30. See, e.g., id (suggesting that specific goals are essential for enabling students
with disabilities to make satisfactory academic progress).
31. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (providing for an IEP team comprising parents, special
and/or regular education teachers, and local education agency representatives, among
others).
32. See id. § 1414(d)(3)(B) (obligating IEP teams to consider the use of Braille
instruction and hearing aids for blind and deaf children, respectively).
33. See OSBORNE & RusSo, supra note 15, at 92 (suggesting that the IEP requires
collaboration from teachers and parents in order to ensure the success of a special
education program).

34. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)
(acknowledging that the rights of students in schools are fundamentally different than
those of adults in other settings), with Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675-76

(1977) (contending that a student does not have an absolute liberty interest in avoiding
corporal punishment).
35. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653-54 (recounting the petitioner's dissatisfaction

with the school's practice).
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punishment may be necessary in a child's education.
Because the
paddling was only used to discipline disobedient students, the Ingraham
Court upheld the policy.37 However, the Court still acknowledged that a
school could violate due process if a teacher exceeds the de minimis level.
Additionally, the Court established standards for determining the liberty
interests of people with disabilities.
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court
considered the liberty interests of a man who was involuntarily confined to
a state mental institution.40 While the Court declined to rule on the due
process claim, in dicta, the Youngberg Court stated that to prevail on a
claim, one must show that the defendant's conduct deviated from
professional standards. 4 1 Following Youngberg, several courts have
applied this test when addressing the use of physical restraints in schools. 4 2
Although this Comment is about the use of mechanical restraints, the
way that several federal courts have addressed physical restraints illustrates
the insufficient legal remedies available for plaintiffs.4 3 For example, in
MH. v. Bristol Board of Education, the teacher squirted water on the
student and forcibly restrained him.44 Despite the denial of the school's
motion for summary judgment, the court ultimately rejected the student's
claim. 45 Accordingly, because so many state laws do not expressly prohibit
restraints, students who are subject to them are often unable to maintain a
36. See id. at 676 (upholding a teacher's use of force for moderate correction).
37. See id. at 677-78 (concluding that the paddling was valid because it was used
sparingly).
38. See id. at 674 (suggesting that a school could implicate a liberty interest if a
teacher deliberately punishes a child to the point of inflicting appreciable pain).
39. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982) (proposing a balancing
test of the government's interest and the liberty interest of the involuntarily

committed).
40. See id at 311 (recounting the allegations of unconstitutional restraints by
doctors in the mental hospital).
41. See id at 330 (Burger, J., concurring) (proclaiming that the proper test for

examining a liberty interest violation is when a caretaker does not exercise his proper
professional judgment).
42. See generally Marquez, supra note 22, at 629-30 (reviewing the judicial
treatment of physical restraints in public schools).
43. See, e.g., Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding
a school's use of "blanket wrapping" on a student). But see M.H. v. Bristol Bd. of
Educ., 169 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30 (D. Conn. 2001) (denying summary judgment for the
school after a teacher physically threatened and spit on a child).
44. See MH., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 24-25 (recounting how the teacher unnecessarily
physically restrained a student).
45. See id. at 23-24 (dismissing the claim because the student failed to show that
the practice was a school policy).
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cause of action.46
In a school context, the chief argument related to mechanical restraints is
that they are unreasonable classroom seizures.47 Under the Fourth
Amendment, a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe that
she is not free to leave.48 To determine whether there is an unreasonable
seizure, the inquiry is two-fold: (1) whether the challenged action is
justified at its inception; and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances.49
Furthermore, to qualify as an unreasonable seizure in a classroom, the
limitation on the student's movement must significantly exceed the
ordinary restrictions inherent in compulsory classroom attendances.50 In
Couture v. Board ofEducation ofAlbuquerque Public Schools, the teachers
frequently placed a child with severe emotional disabilities in a time-out
room. 5 ' In addition to physically carrying the child into the room, the
teachers also denied his requests for release. 5 2 Because the student had
severe emotional disabilities, the Tenth Circuit held that the time-out room
was a valid seizure because it was necessary for the child to cooperate.53
D. Facts andProceduralHistory of Ebonie S. v. Pueblo School
District No. 60
In Ebonie S. v. Pueblo School DistrictNo. 60, a student diagnosed with
developmental and intellectual disabilities was placed in a class for
46. Compare JONES & FEDER, supra note 2, at 7 (noting the insufficient protection
that states give to students with disabilities because IDEA does not specifically address
the use of restraints), with Perry Zirkel, Restraining the Use of Restraints ForStudents
With Disabilities:An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Case Law, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 323,
327 (2011) (conceding that nineteen states entirely lack legislation regarding
restraints).
47. See JONES & FEDER, supra note 2, at 4-5 (explaining that restraints are
frequently challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds).
48. See, e.g., Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243,
1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (proclaiming the proper test for a Fourth Amendment claim).
49. See id. (insisting that the treatment of seizures must differ in a classroom
context because students are not free to leave at their own volition).
50. See id. at 1251 (stressing the need for context to determine the reasonableness
of an in-school seizure because students in school are under the authority of the
teachers).
51. See id. at 1247 (describing the troublesome behavior of a child that led the

teachers to isolate him from the rest of the class).
52. See id. at 1251 (approving of the detention due to the student's violent threats
and temper tantrums).
53. See id. at 1253 (finding that the seizure was necessary because of the unique
challenges that the student posed).
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exceptional students taught by Marilyn Golden.54 The classroom featured
desks that were U-shaped in a way that surrounded a student on three sides
when the chair was completely pulled in.5 Additionally, the desk featured
a wooden bar that rested behind the chair to secure the student into place.56
Although Ebonie had an IEP that authorized the use of the desk, such use
was not authorized as a disciplinary method." Golden insisted on using the
desk in order to discipline Ebonie and to ensure that she remained on task.
On April 9, 2007, Golden sent Ebonie home with a fractured upper arm; an
expert later opined that the fracture could be related to the desk. 59
Subsequently, Ebonie's mother, Mary, removed her from the school and
filed an administrative claim against the school district. 60
While the hearing officer determined that Ebonie had been deprived of a
FAPE and that the desk was prohibited by the Colorado Protection of
Persons from Restraint Act, the officer declined to award Ebonie any
damages.
Mary subsequently filed suit in the District Court for the
District of Colorado, which, on May 3, 2011, dismissed Ebonie's Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims.6 2 On August 28, 2012, on appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment 63 Additionally, the
court refused to issue a ruling on whether the desk violated state law or
IDEA. 4 The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but on March

54. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1054 (10th Cir.
2012) (discussing Ebonie's condition upon being enrolled at Bessemer Academy).
55. See id. (detailing how the distinct characteristics of the desk, like the wooden
bar, the shape of the desk, and the barrel bolt, restricted Ebonie's movement).
56. See id. (describing the bar that runs the length of the back of the desk that rests
behind the student's chair, thereby restricting movement).
57. See id. at 1055 (noting that Mary revoked her consent upon learning that the
desk was not being used in accordance with the IEP).
58. See, e.g., id. (conceding that the teachers placed students with disabilities in the
desks in non-emergency situations).
59. See id. (describing the events that led Mary to file suit).
60. See id. (explaining that Mary removed her daughter from the school after
Ebonie fractured her arm).
61. See id. (noting the hearing officer's refusal to award damages due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction).
62. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D.
Colo. 2011) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants).
63. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1059 (holding that plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims fail as a matter of law).
64. See id. at 1054 (declining to offer a view on the validity of the desk under
either statute).
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18, 2013, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari.6 5
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Tenth Circuit Improperly GrantedSummary Judgment to the School
Because Mechanical RestraintsAre UnreasonableSeizures and Thus
Violate the FourthAmendment.
In granting summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff
did not allege sufficient facts to support a plausible legal claim.
Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to legal judgment. 7 In Ebonie S.,
the grant of summary judgment was improper because the plaintiff
presented enough material facts to support her Fourth Amendment claim. 68
1. The MechanicalRestraints Were UnreasonableBecause They Were Not
Justified at the Inception.
The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."69 However, when assessing this right in a school setting, context
is imperative to the analysis. 70 Accordingly, both the interests of the school
as well as those of the student must be balanced in order to make this
determination.
The first step in this analysis is to determine if a seizure occurred.72 In a
school context, the school must restrict a student's freedom to a degree that

65. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2257 (U.S. 2013)
(declining to review the Tenth Circuit's decision).
66. See id. at 1059 (affirming the summary judgment granted by the district court).
67. See, e.g., Bertsch v. Overstock.com, 684 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 2012)
(asserting that the nonmoving party must present salient evidence in order to reverse a
lower court's summary judgment grant).
68. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (recounting the school's practice of frequently
placing Ebonie in the desk).
69. See U.S. CONsT. AMEND. IV (establishing one's right to be free from
unwarranted intrusions that violate privacy interests).
70. See Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 1250-51
(10th Cir. 2008) (discussing the fundamental differences between seizures in lawenforcement settings and educational settings).
71. See id. at 1250 (proposing a balancing of student's privacy rights with the
school's tutelary and custodial responsibility).
72. See id. (discussing the need to balance privacy rights with school responsibility
in a seizure inquiry).
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In
is greater than what is ordinarily compulsory for daily attendance.
Couture, the court upheld the school's use of a time-out room as a method
of disciplining a troublesome student.74 Because the student's emotional
outbursts presented unique problems to his teachers, it was reasonable for
the school to limit his movement. 75 Therefore, in Couture, the Tenth
Circuit correctly held that the student was seized.
Similarly, in the instant case, Ebonie was confined to a U-shaped desk
Because Ebonie did not have the
that surrounded her on three sides.
motor skills to unfasten the desk and was often placed in the desk with the
bar down for extended periods of time, she, like the student in Couture,
was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. 78
One could argue that Ebonie was not seized since the desk did nothing
more than force her to assume a position required of all students.7 9
However, because Ebonie lacked the motor skills that most ordinary
students possess, the desk significantly restricted her freedom of
movement.80 Thus, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly granted summary
judgment because Ebonie presented a cognizable Fourth Amendment
claim.8 1
In Ebonie S., the use of the desk constituted a seizure because the
wooden bar that rests behind the chair made it impossible for Ebonie to
push her chair out. 82 Because the desk was a seizure, the Tenth Circuit
73. See, eg., id. at 1251 (describing an invalid seizure as an intrusion that is not

justified at its inception and not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances).
74. See id. (recounting the way that the teachers treated a child with severe
emotional disabilities).
75. See id. at 1254 (approving of the student's lengthy detention because his
teachers had a reasonable apprehension of violence).
76. See id. at 1251 (finding that there was a seizure since the student was carried
into the room by the teachers).
77. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1054 (10th Cir.
2012) (explaining how the desk restricted movement because it forced the student to be
surrounded when the chair was completely pulled in).
78. Compare id. at 1055 (describing the way that the barrel bolt restricted Ebonie's
movement), with Couture, 535 F.3d at 1255 (describing the confining features of the
small room, specifically, the black construction paper on the windows).
79. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1057 (insisting that the desk did nothing more than
force the student to maintain standard classroom posture).
80. Compare id. at 1054-55 (admitting that Ebonie lacked the motor skills required
to unfasten the desk), with Couture, 535 F.3d at 1251 (inferring that time-out rooms are
seizures because they subject a student's movement to great restrictions).
81. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1057 (holding that Ebonie was not seized).
82. See id. at 1055 (explaining how the desk seized Ebonie because the wooden bar
that runs the length of the desk prevents a student from getting out of her seat).
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should have proceeded to apply the two-fold inquiry to assess the
reasonableness of the practice.8 3 The use of the desk with a restraint was
unreasonable because it was not justified at its inception and was not
reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the interference in the
first place. 84
The determination of whether a seizure is justified at its inception is a
question of law that examines the reasonableness of the seizure in light of
the school environment.ss In Couture, the court held that the use of a timeout room was valid because the student presented unique behavioral
challenges to his teachers.86
In Ebonie's case, however, the use of the desk was not justified because

Ebonie did not need the desk for orthopedic purposes. 87 Moreover, because
it was never used for emergency or safety purposes, the first prong of the
seizure inquiry is not met.
Thus, unlike the situation in Couture, the
school's motivation for seizing Ebonie was unreasonable.89
Furthermore, Ebonie's behavior in school does not justify the school's
practice of restraining her in the wrap-around desk. 90 In Couture, the
student's IEP indicated that time-outs were needed in order to obtain his
cooperation. 91 Conversely, Ebonie's IEP only provided for the use of the
wrap-around desk in order to keep her in her seat, not for behavioral
modification purposes. 92 Thus, because the teachers in the instant case
83. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1251 (applying the two-part test to determine the
reasonableness of a seizure).
84. See id. at 1251-53 (explaining the justification and reasonableness prongs of the
seizure inquiry and stressing the need for context to be a facet in this determination).
85. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985) (holding that
reasonableness encompasses the student's privacy interests and the school's interest in
preserving order).
86. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1251 (explaining that the student's IEP called for
time-outs to promote cooperation).
87. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (conceding that the teachers placed Ebonie in
the wrap-around desk in order to discipline her).
88. See id. at 1054-55 (suggesting plausible explanations for the use of a wraparound desk that do not apply to Ebonie's case).
89. But see Couture, 535 F.3d at 1247 (recounting how the student frequently used
profanity and threatened to kill others).
90. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (D.
Colo. 2011) (admitting that Ebonie's IEP specified for the desk to be used only to keep
her in her seat).
91. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1256 (upholding the use of the time-out room since
the student's problems posed a major challenge).
92. See Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (noting that Ebonie's mother did not
authorize the desk to be used for disciplinary purposes).
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exceeded the limits that were stipulated in Ebonie's IEP, the seizure was
not justified at its inception.9 3
2. The MechanicalRestraints Were UnreasonablyRelated in Scope to the
Circumstances That Justified the Interference in the FirstPlace.
The second step is to determine if the seizure was permissible in scope to
the circumstances that justified the interference.94 A seizure is permissible
in scope when it is reasonable both in light of the characteristics of the
student as well as those of the infraction.95 In Couture, the use of the timeout room was valid because the time-outs were used for the behavioral
modification of a disruptive student.9 6 Because the student in Couture
posed a clear threat to his teachers, the school's use of the time-out room
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances.9 7
In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit relied on Couture to justify the use
of the wrap-around desk.98 This reliance on Couture was improper because
of some critical factual differences between the circumstances of the two
cases. 99 These differences relate to: (1) the student's behavior prior to
being seized; (2) the school's motivation for seizing the student; and (3) the
scope of the limitation in relation to the student's conduct.' 00
First, the teachers in Ebonie S. regularly placed Ebonie in the desk, even
though her IEP required her teachers to use the desk only to ensure that she
93. Compare Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (noting that Ebonie was placed in the
desk for a longer time than her IEP required), with Couture, 535 F.3d at 1253 (noting
that the student continued to be violent even after being detained).
94. See, e.g., Couture, 535 F.3d at 1253 (emphasizing the importance of context in
order to satisfy the second prong of the in-school seizure reasonableness test).
95. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (suggesting that
factors such as the age and sex of the student as well as the nature of the infraction are
germane to the reasonableness inquiry); accordCouture, 535 F.3d at 1253 (establishing
the relationship between the measures and objectives of the seizure).
96. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1251 (observing that the student repeatedly cursed at
his teachers and was physically violent).
97. See id at 1253 (justifying the use of the time-out room because of the student's
violent behavior).
98. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D.
Colo. 2011) (affirming a reluctance to depart from Couture's interpretation of
reasonableness).
99. Compare Couture, 535 F.3d at 1251 (remarking on the student's violent
outbursts), with Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (conceding that the school regularly
placed Ebonie in the desk with the bar down although the bar was to be used solely for
safety purposes).
100. See infra Part III (explaining the key differences between Ebonie S. and
Couture to critique the Tenth Circuit's decision).
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remained on task.101 However, on some occasions, Ebonie was in the desk
for one hour with the bar in place the entire time.' 02 Similarly, in Couture,
the student was seized on a regular basis as his detentions sometimes lasted
for periods of greater than an hour. 0 3 However, the critical difference
between the instant case and Couture is that Ebonie's behavior prior to
being seized did not justify the school's frequency in restraining her.104
Furthermore, the desk was never used as an emergency measure. 05
While one could argue for the use of the wrap-around desk to ensure safety
within the classroom, such use was unjustified because Ebonie did not pose
a threat to her teachers. 06 Conversely, in Couture, because the student's
taunts and tantrums threatened the safety of his teachers, the teachers were
justified in confining him to the time-out room. 0 7 Unlike that of the
student in Couture, Ebonie's behavior was never dangerous; thus, because
the school's motivation for seizing Ebonie was not reasonably related to the
circumstances, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on Couture was improper.'08
Lastly, the use of the wrap-around desk was a limitation on Ebonie's
movement that exceeded reasonable bounds.' 09 In placing Ebonie in the
wrap-around desk for long time periods, the school exceeded reasonable
bounds because Ebonie never behaved violently.11o In Couture, the
frequent use of the time-out room was not excessive because that student
101. Compare Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir.
2012) (indicating that Ebonie's mother did not intend for the desk to be used for
discipline), with Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (remarking that the
paraprofessionals kept Ebonie in the wrap-around desk on a regular basis).
102. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (relaying Mary's observations of Ebonie being
placed in the desk too frequently).
103. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1253 (recounting the long periods of the time that the
student was detained due to his conduct).
104. Compare Couture, 535 F.3d at 1254 (finding that the time-out room was valid
because the student posed a threat to his teachers), with Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at
1184 (conceding that the use of the desk exceeded the limits of the IEP).
105. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (admitting that Ebonie was never violent).
106. See Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (noting that the bar was to be used
solely for emergency and safety purposes).
107. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1254 (emphasizing how the student continued to spit,
scream, and curse even after being detained).
108. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1056-57 (deciding to rely on Couture despite its
critical differences from the instant case).
109. See Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (acknowledging that the desk placed
significant restrictions on Ebonie's movement because she was physically unable to lift

the bar up).
110. See id. at 1184 (admitting that the teachers only intended for the desk to be
used for students who presented an imminent threat).
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exhibited destructive behavior."' Accordingly, because Ebonie's conduct
was distinct from that of the student in Couture, the Tenth Circuit erred in
its application of Couture.112
Due to these crucial factual differences between the two cases, the Tenth
Circuit should not have granted summary judgment for the school."' The
facts pertaining to Ebonie's behavior prior to being seized, the school's
motivation prior to seizing her, and the scope of the limitation all merit
further examination with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim."14
Because these facts could conceivably support Ebonie's assertion that the
desk was an unreasonable seizure, the Tenth Circuit should not have
granted summary judgment to the school.! 15
B. The Tenth CircuitImproperly Dismissedthe Student's Fourteenth
Amendment Claim Because the Teachers Exceeded the De Minimis Level of
Imposition By Discipliningthe Student in a Way that CausedAppreciable
PhysicalPain.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit erred in granting summary judgment on
the due process claim.1 6 As previously discussed, a movant is only
entitled to judgment as a matter of law when there is no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to the plaintiff's claims." 7 However, because the
facts that the plaintiff in Ebonie S. alleged were material and could
conceivably support a due process violation, the Tenth Circuit erred in
dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment claim." 8
111. See Couture, 535 F.3d at 1251-52 (implying that the time-outs were an
appropriate response to control the student's troublesome behavior).
112. But see Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (conceding that Ebonie never
behaved violently).
113. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (affirming
that the legal significance of a fact depends on its materiality to the plaintiffs
allegations).
114. See Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1183-84 (conceding that Ebonie was never
dangerous, that the school used the desk to threaten her, and that Ebonie was in the
desk for excessive time periods).
115. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (maintaining that a movant is not entitled to
summary judgment if the non-movant has presented material facts that warrant further
analysis).
116. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir.
2012) (dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment claim due to the lack of an intent to
cause harm).
117. See, e.g., Bertsch v. Overstock.com, 684 F.3d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 2012)
(averring that the summary judgment inquiry is one that determines whether a plaintiff
has alleged facts to persuade a reasonable jury).
118. See Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (admitting that the teachers used the
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When the Tenth Circuit granted summary judgment on the due process
claim, the court held that Ebonie did not assert adequate facts to support a
tenable claim.1 9 This judgment was improper because the Tenth Circuit
relied heavily on Ingraham v. Wright without acknowledging critical
differences between the two cases.12 0 Further, the Tenth Circuit failed to
acknowledge how Ebonie's disabilities could change the analysis.'12
The Supreme Court, in Ingraham, held that a school could use corporal
punishment on middle school students.122 Because the practice of paddling
disobedient students was a reasonable aspect of disciplinary authority, the
Court held that such force was justifiable.123 Nevertheless, the Court
acknowledged that a teacher could violate a student's due process rights if
that teacher exceeds the de minimis level of imposition.124 Specifically, the
Court stated that this level is exceeded when a teacher deliberately decides
25
to punish a child in a manner that causes appreciable physical pain.1
In Ebonie S., the Tenth Circuit relied on Ingraham to conclude that the
teachers did not violate Ebonie's rights.12 6 This application of Ingraham
was improper because the teachers in the instant case exceeded the de
minimis level of imposition by placing Ebonie in the desk with the bar
127
down in a manner that could conceivably result in physical injury.
First, in Ebonie S., the teachers deliberately punished Ebonie for
desk to regularly threaten Ebonie even though she was never violent).
119. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1059 (finding that the restraint did not implicate due
process interests because it did not rise to the level of a seizure).
120. Compare Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977) (recounting the
practice of paddling students in a way that did not cause any injury), with Ebonie S.,
695 F.3d at 1055 (suggesting a connection between the desk and the injury).
121. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1054 (describing how Ebonie's developmental
impairments affected her motor skills and perception of restraint in the classroom).
122. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682 (holding that the practice of paddling students
was valid because it had a reasonable relationship to educational goals).
123. See id. at 676 (finding that the paddling maintained the proper balance of both
the student's and school's interests).
124. See, e.g., id. at 674 (noting that the de minimis level that exceeds due process is
when a teacher disciplines a student using force that ultimately causes physical harm).
125. See id. (identifying the necessary factors that could allow one to present a valid
Fourteenth Amendment claim).
126. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1058 (analogizing between the paddling in
Ingraham and the use of the desk to conclude that both measures were valid because
they did not cause appreciable pain).
127. Compare Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 656-57 (recounting that the paddling consisted
of a few blows and did not cause any tangible injury), with Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055
(noting that Ebonie was placed in the desk for excessive time periods and that she
subsequently sustained an injury).
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misconduct.12 8 Because Ebonie's teachers routinely placed her in the desk
to intimidate and discipline her, the first element in establishing that a de
minimis level was exceeded is met. 12 9 One may argue that the teachers'
conduct did not exceed this level since Ebonie's disabilities presented
unique challenges to her teachers.13 0 However, because Ebonie was placed
in the desk for excessive time periods and because several teachers
admitted to using the wrap-around desks in order to intimidate the students,
the school officials deliberately punished Ebonie in a way that is
inconsistent with the holding in Ingraham.'3 1
Furthermore, the disciplinary practice in the instant case restrained
Ebonie because the teachers placed Ebonie in the wrap-around desk with
the bar down, thus encumbering her movement.13 2 Accordingly, because
the desk was equipped with a barrel bolt that prevented Ebonie from
moving while seated, the bolt restrained Ebonie.133 One could argue that
Ebonie was not restrained since the restraining mechanisms were not
attached to her body.134 However, because Ebonie had limited motor skills
that stymied her ability to escape from the sedentary position, Ebonie was
Thus, the teachers
indeed restrained by the wrap-around desk.' 35
disciplined Ebonie in a manner that is significantly different from that of
the students in Ingraham.'3 6
Lastly, the teachers in Ebonie S. inflicted appreciable physical pain on
128. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (D.
Colo. 2011) (noting that the teachers often used the desks for discipline).
129. See id. at 1184 (admitting that the teachers placed Ebonie in the desk to
intimidate her).
130. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1059 (upholding the school's practice because
Ebonie's disabilities could frustrate classroom management).
131. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 656-57 (concluding that the paddling was a minor
form of discipline since it was limited to one to five blows). But see Ebonie S., 695
F.3d at 1055 (suggesting that the teachers used the desk excessively since they never
needed it for emergencies and often kept Ebonie in the desk with the bar down for over
an hour).
132. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1054-55 (remarking that the bolt restricted Ebonie's
movement since it extended across the chair, thus locking Ebonie in one position).
133. See id (noting that the desk restrained Ebonie because the barrel bolt precluded
Ebonie from pushing out her chair).
134. See id. at 1057 (arguing that Ebonie was not seized because the mechanisms
did not physically bind her down, making it possible for her to escape the desk by
crawling out).
135. See id. at 1054-55 (admitting that Ebonie's poor motor skills prevented her
from escaping from the desk).
136. Contra Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676 (approving of the paddling as a generally
accepted form of punishment).
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Ebonie.137 In the instant case, the teachers placed Ebonie in the desk with
the bar down in order to impede her movement.' 38 As previously
discussed, Ebonie did not have the motor skills to unfasten the bar or to
escape from the desk. 139 Thus, because Ebonie fractured her upper arm
after being placed in the desk, the teachers' disciplinary technique inflicted
appreciable physical pain. 14 0 One could argue that the teachers did not
inflict appreciable physical pain because they did not intentionally harm
Ebonie.14'
However, because the teachers in Ebonie S. deliberately
disregarded Ebonie's IEP in order to punish her in a way that caused her
appreciable physical harm, the teachers' use of the desk fell outside the de
minimis level of imposition articulated by the Ingraham Court.14 2
In Ingraham, the teachers did not exceed the de minimis level of
imposition because the paddling was used sparingly and did not cause any
appreciable physical pain.143 Conversely, in Ebonie S., the teachers
frequently placed a student with limited motor skills in a desk that featured
a mechanism restricting her movement. 1" Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
erred in its application of Ingraham because the teachers in Ebonie S.
exceeded the de minimis level of imposition.145
The Tenth Circuit erred in granting summary judgment to the school
because Ebonie presented a cognizable due process claim.14 6 In Ebonie S.,
137. Compare id at 657 (observing that the paddling did not cause any significant
physical injury to the students), with Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (suggesting that the
use of the desk could cause an injury).
138. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (D.
Colo. 2011) (explaining that the teachers used the desk for discipline and punishment).
139. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1054-55 (noting that Ebonie's disabilities placed
obstacles on her ability to move).
140. See id. (indicating that the use of the desk with the restraining bar was a
probable explanation for Ebonie's arm fracture).
141. See id. at 1058 (insisting that a teacher's negligent act should not implicate a
cognizable liberty interest).
142. Contra Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676 (affirming that a due process violation may
occur when a teacher deliberately disciplines a student and ultimately causes harm).
143. Compare id. at 657 (emphasizing that the paddling was minimal because of the
small size of the paddle, the infrequency by which students were spanked, and the
negligible pain it could cause), with Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1183-84 (noting that
Ebonie was placed in the desk with regularity and that her limited motor skills made it
difficult for her to escape).
144. Contra Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (noting that the teachers exceeded the
limits of Ebonie's IEP by placing her in the desk for non-emergency situations).
145. See id. at 1058 (finding that the use of the wrap-around desks was a reasonable
disciplinary measure similar to the corporal punishment in Ingraham).
146. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (asserting
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the teachers disciplined a student with mild learning disabilities excessively
in a way that could conceivably cause injury. 147 Since the teachers
exceeded the de minimis level of imposition, the Tenth Circuit should have
conducted further examination into the due process violation because the
facts that the plaintiff alleged are material.148 Accordingly, the school
district was not entitled to summary judgment.149
C. The School DeprivedEbonie of a FAPE Because Ebonie Did Not
Receive a SpecializedEducation that Addressed Her Needs.
The Tenth Circuit did not rule on the plaintiff s claims under the ADA or
the Rehabilitation Act in Ebonie S.i5o More importantly, the Tenth Circuit
did not consider whether the school's use of the wrap-around desk deprived
Ebonie of a free appropriate public education.' 5 ' However, prior to the
lower court proceedings, a hearing officer ruled that the school's practice
did not satisfy IDEA; thus, the Tenth Circuit erred in failing to consider the
merits of the IDEA claim.' 52
According to IDEA, every student with a disability is entitled to a
FAPE.'53 The inquiry regarding the appropriateness of the education
pertains specifically to the administration of the educational program.154
An educational program is appropriate when the instruction is specially
designed to meet the academic needs of an exceptional student.'5 5 Because
that a cognizable claim precludes a grant of summary judgment).
147. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1059 (holding that the teachers' actions were

appropriate in the special education context).
148. See Ebonie S., 819 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (highlighting the frequency by which
the teacher placed Ebonie in the desk).
149. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (declaring that a teacher can
violate a student's due process rights when she exceeds the de minimis level); see also
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (affirming that summary judgment is only proper when
there are no genuine factual issues).
150. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1059 (refusing to address the claims under either
federal statute because judgment on either would likely intrude on local educational
policy).
151. See id. at 1054 (expressing a refusal to offer any view on the non-constitutional
claims).
152. See id. at 1055 (remarking on the administrative law proceedings where the
officer ruled that the school's use of the desk violated the statute).
153. See Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A)
(1978) (mandating that a school must provide all children with an "appropriate
education" to receive public funding).
154. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.39 (2006) (noting that an appropriate education is specially
designed to meet a student's unique needs).
155. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 401(26)(A) (mandating that schools provide students with
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an integral component of special education is an IEP, it is imperative that
the teachers adhere to the student's academic achievement and annual
progress goals.1 56
In Rowley, the Supreme Court held that a school's IDEA obligation was
to provide the child with a basic floor of opportunity for academic
success.157 The parents wanted the school to provide their deaf daughter
with a sign language interpreter for her academic classes." 8 However,
because the student was still able to perform well academically, the Court
denied the parents' request.15 9
In Ebonie S., the Tenth Circuit refused to address the validity of the
school's use of the wrap-around desk under IDEA.160 However, the school
deprived Ebonie of her right to a FAPE because she did not receive
specialized instruction tailored to her benefit.161 Additionally, the teachers
deprived Ebonie of a FAPE because they used the desk in a manner that is
inconsistent with Ebonie's IEP.162
In Rowley, the student was able to adjust well to the classroom
environment because the school provided her with supplementary services
that assisted her with her disability. 6 3 Conversely, in Ebonie S., Ebonie
was routinely placed in the wrap-around desk and often neglected by her

interpretive, psychological, and speech-language pathology services).
156. See § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(cc) (emphasizing that an ideal IEP includes
alternative assessments for students with special needs to ensure that they are able to
progress academically).
157. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cen. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
201 (1982) (affirming the purpose of the statute as a means of ensuring that
handicapped students have access to basic services).
158. See id. at 184-85 (recounting how the school refused to provide the student
with an interpreter).
159. See id at 210 (affirming the school's refusal to provide the student with an
interpreter because the student had received sufficient personalized instruction to meet
her needs).
160. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1056 (10th Cir.
2012) (declining to offer insight on the legality of the desk in spite of the hearing
officer's finding).
161. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(A)(i)(II)(1)(mandating for support services to be
specially tailored to meet students' needs), with Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (remarking
that Ebonie was not progressing academically). But see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(A)(1)
(requiring schools to ensure that the services benefit exceptional students).
162. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (recounting Mary's dissatisfaction with the
school for using the desk for discipline).
163. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184 (recounting how the student benefited from
supplemental services).
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teachers. 16 While one could argue that the teachers needed to place Ebonie
in the desk to maintain order in the classroom, Ebonie's IEP called for the
teachers to remain in close proximity and work with her when she was in
the desk.' 65 Thus, the teachers deprived Ebonie of a FAPE by consistently
failing to provide Ebonie with specialized instruction.' 66
Furthermore, the frequent use of the wrap-around desk did not provide
Ebonie with a basic floor of opportunity.'6 7 In Rowley, the school provided
the student with a hearing aid and a tutor to assist her in the classroom. 168
In Ebonie S., however, the desk was only to be used to keep Ebonie in her
seat.16 9 Thus, since the teachers placed Ebonie in the desk to intimidate and
discipline her, the school failed to use the desk in a way that provided
Ebonie with meaningful educational benefit.170
Additionally, the school in Ebonie S. deprived Ebonie of a FAPE
because the teachers used the desk in a way that did not comply with the
IEP. 17 In Rowley, the Court acknowledged the importance of the IEP in
promoting parental involvement in a student's education.1 72 However, the
teachers disregarded the IEP when they repeatedly placed Ebonie in the
wrap-around desk to punish her for misbehavior.173 In sum, the school
deprived Ebonie of an appropriate education because the teachers violated

164. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (D.
Colo. 2011) (observing that Ebonie's teachers confined Ebonie to the desk and did not
assist her).
165. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (noting that Mary never consented to using the
desk as a disciplinary measure).
166. See id. (remarking on Mary's dissatisfaction with her daughter's lack of
academic progress and the school's failure to address the matter).
167. Contra Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (emphasizing Congress's intent for an
appropriate education to be one that provides the child with some meaningful benefits).
168. See id at 184 (describing the steps that the school took to permit a deaf student
to make academic progress).
169. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 khighlighting that Ebonie's mother had only
consented for the use of the desk on rare occasions).
170. Compare Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185 (observing the deaf student's satisfactory
progress without the interpreter), with Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (conceding that
Ebonie had been deprived of a free and public education at Bessemer Academy).
171. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (emphasizing the importance of the IEP in the
appropriateness inquiry).
172. See id. at 184 (relaying the parents' efforts to ensure that their deaf daughter
had a hearing aid, a tutor, and a speech therapist during school hours).
173. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 2d. 1179, 1184 (D.
Colo. 2011) (admitting instances where the teachers used the desk to intimidate
Ebonie).
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the provisions of her specific IEP.174
Lastly, the teachers deprived Ebonie of a FAPE because they
undermined her mother's involvement in her education. 175 After Ebonie's
mother observed that the teachers were ignoring the IEP, she revoked her
However, the teachers continued to
approval of the use of the desk.
discipline Ebonie through use of the desk, ultimately leading to Ebonie
fracturing her arm.'" While one could argue that the teachers did not
deliberately cause Ebonie harm, they nevertheless deliberately disregarded
the IEP and undermined the parent's role in the educational process. 7 8
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit erred in not addressing the IDEA claim. 79
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Although the use of mechanical restraints on exceptional and special
needs students is an important education law issue, the absence of any
federal law means the subject does not get the attention that it deserves. 80
Prior to the 2009 GAO report, there was no mandatory reporting
requirement.' 8 ' Although Congress has made an effort to address the issue,
the resulting legislation has proved unsuccessful, and thus these measures
can hardly be viewed as progress.' 8 2
174. But see Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)
(1978) (requiring that educational services be administered in accordance with the
IEP).
175. Contra Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209 (highlighting the importance of parental

involvement in helping exceptional children progress academically).
176. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir.
2012) (describing Mary's concern regarding her daughter's lack of progress).
177. See id. (remarking that the teachers continued to use the desk for a month after
Ebonie's mother revoked her consent to the school).
178. Compare Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184 (recounting the several meetings that the
parents had with the teachers), with Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1055 (admitting that the
teachers consistently used the desk for unauthorized purposes).
179. See Ebonie S., 695 F.3d at 1054 (declining to rule on the lawfulness of the desk
under the ADA or IDEA).
180. See JONES & FEDER, supra note 2, at 9-10 (noting the lack of federal standards
regulating the issue, in contrast to a variety of state regulations).
181. See id. at 15 (suggesting how instances of unreported abuse that students
endured could be due to the absence of reporting requirements).
182. Compare Daniel Stewart, How Do The States Regulate Restraint and Seclusion
in Public Schools? A Survey of the Strengths and Weaknesses in State Laws, 34
HAMLINE L. REv. 531, 534 (2011) (acknowledging the weak federal policy response in
spite of strong awareness efforts made by disability rights advocacy organizations),
with Nat'l Disability Rights Network, School Is Not Supposed to Hurt, 17 (Mar. 2012),
http://ndrn.org/images/documents/publications/reports/SchoolisNot Supposed-to_H
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Since federal law does not specifically address restraints and seclusion,
and because courts are reluctant to interfere with educational policy, efforts
should be made on a local level to encourage active participation by
parents, teachers, and local legislators in shaping education policy. 83
Specifically, legislators should require parents to meet four times during
the school year to discuss appropriate behavioral management techniques
within the students' IEPs; given that students are evaluated quarterly, four
times a year is optimal.184 Because an IEP is the blueprint that contains
measurable goals for students with disabilities, legislators should require
parents to do more to hold teachers accountable for complying with the
IEPs.18
In Ebonie S., the student's IEP specified for the wrap-around desk to be
only used for emergencies and not as a disciplinary technique.' 86
Nevertheless, the teachers exceeded the limits of the IEP without any
rational justification.' 87 Furthermore, after Ebonie's mother revoked her
consent of the desk, the teachers persisted in using the desk for nonemergency measures, thus depriving Ebonie of a free and appropriate
public education.' 8 8 Accordingly, legislators should require parents to play
an active role in devising the IEP and ensuring that teachers are acting in
accordance with its terms.' 89
Additionally, legislators should encourage parents to use dispute

urt_3_v7.pdf (discussing how H.R. 4247 failed to pass in the Senate).
183. Compare JONES & FEDER, supra note 2, at 10 (attributing the insufficient legal
remedies to the absence of specific language in the IDEA), with OSBORNE & Russo,
supra note 15, at 200 (proposing that parents should work closely with teachers in
developing IEPs).
184. See JONES & FEDER, supra note 2, at 9 (emphasizing the critical role that IEP
teams play in developing appropriate behavioral management techniques for students).
185. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 15, at 84 (averring the importance of

parental involvement in the IEP process).
186. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir.
2012) (noting Mary's dissatisfaction with the teachers' use of the desk).
187. See Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (D. Colo.
2011) (conceding that the teachers placed students in the desk to intimidate and punish
students).
188. See supra Part III.C (arguing that the teachers deprived Ebonie of a FAPE
because Ebonie did not enjoy any educational benefit from the frequent use of the

desk).
189. Compare JOSHUA CORRIGAN, INDIVIDUAL WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT:

162 (2010) (arguing that an increased parental role will better address
students' academic needs), with Osborne & Russo, supra note 15, at 84 (affirming the
importance of the parent's role in the IEP process).
DEVELOPMENTS
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resolution.190 Because litigation is costly and often an ineffective means of
enforcing the rights of special education students, mediation could foster
stronger parental collaboration with teachers.' 9' Presently, IDEA requires
states to offer free mediation services to parents prior to holding a due
process hearing.19 2 However, because litigation often arises out of minor
misunderstandings between parents and teachers, mediation will reduce the
amount of litigation in the courts.'93
In Ebonie S., mediation would have been beneficial since there was clear
disagreement between Ebonie's mother and Ebonie's teachers about
Ebonie's educational progress.194 Because the active participation of
parents is imperative to strengthen communication between parents and
teachers, legislators should take more steps to enforce the mediation
requirements of IDEA.195
V. CONCLUSION

Although the IDEA was a major milestone in special education law, the
deference that courts give to teachers' actions frustrate a student's ability to
prevail when she is deprived of a free and appropriate public education.19 6
Ebonie S. illustrates the insufficient legal recourse available to many
students because ofjudicial reluctance to interfere with education policy.' 9 7
In Ebonie S., the Tenth Circuit improperly granted summary judgment to
190. See generally OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 15, at 211 (noting that mediation
is a more reasonable alternative to litigation).
191. See CORRIGAN supra note 189, at 208 (highlighting the inefficiency of
litigation and suggesting that parents should take preventative measures).
192. See Individual With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (1978)
(establishing mediation procedures between parents and teachers as a procedural
safeguard to protect the rights of students).
193. See generally OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 15, at 211 (discussing the
advantages of mediation).
194. See, e.g., Ebonie S. v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 695 F.3d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir.
2012) (recounting how even after the mother revoked her consent of the wrap-around
desk to school officials, the teachers used the desk).
195. Compare CORRIGAN, supra note 189, at 149 (asserting that the mediation
requirement was added to IDEA in order to strengthen communication lines between
parents and teachers), with OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 15, at 84 (proclaiming the
importance of the parent's role in special education).
196. See Marquez, supra note 22, at 632 (attributing the flaws of the adjudicatory
process to the difficulty of overcoming the presumption of validity that courts give to
schools).
197. See supra Part HI.C (criticizing the Rowley decision as a barrier to enforcing
special education rights as it sets a low bar for schools to meet in order to comply with
IDEA).
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the school district because the school's use of a wrap-around desk on a
student who was never dangerous or violent was an unreasonable seizure
that deprived the student of due process and of a FAPE.198 Because of the
uncertainty regarding the role of Congress in addressing restraints and
seclusion, and the absence of statutory guidelines in the IDEA, this
problem may be better resolved on a local level. Specifically, a measure
that calls for active parent involvement may be better suited.'9 9 Perhaps if
parents are compelled to hold teachers accountable to the goals of the IEP,
then the education that special education students have will ultimately be
more appropriate.200

198. See supra Part III (arguing that the wrap-around desk was an unreasonable
seizure and that the Tenth Circuit should have addressed the IDEA claims).
199. See OSBORNE & Russo, supra note 15, at 93 (asserting that because students
needs change over the course of the academic year, and that parents need to
periodically meet with teachers to discuss the educational progress of their children).
200. See supra Part IV (concluding that increased parental involvement will enhance
the quality of education for students).
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